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Moving away from common sense: the impact of the juridification of human rights  
‘If in such cases where human rights and human rights legislation are cited, 
and the conclusion reached runs counter to common sense, then the 
conclusion is wrong.’ 
Lord Falconer1 
Introduction2  
There has been a documented series of relentless attacks against the Human Rights Act 
(HRA) led by a part of the centre-right leaning press, with headlines such as ‘How Europe’s 
human rights court has made a mockery of British justice’ (Daily Mail 1 August 2015), ‘It’s 
time to stop crazy human rights rulings from European judges’ (The Sun, 26 July 2014), 
‘Human Rights madness to end’ (Daily express, 3 October 2014) or ‘“Rights” that make a 
mockery of our courts’ (Daily Telegraph, 27 April 2013).  
These newspapers are among the leading opponents of the HRA3. Through the qualifiers 
used (mockery, crazy, mad etc.), they insist that (mostly European) judges have lost 
‘common sense’ when applying the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR). The 
usual response from human rights lawyers and other defenders of the HRA/ECHR is to 
challenge the quality of the criticisms made. They highlight the errors, exaggerations and 
misinformation that many of these articles bear.4  They tend to insist that the attacks are 
actually a form of ‘monstering’5, a demonization of the HRA/ECHR rather than a proper 
discussion of controversial issues.  
This paper follows a different approach. It does not challenge the existence of ‘monstering’ 
(some of which have been condemned by the courts) but rather seeks to complement the 
analysis of the misrepresentations conveyed by part of the media. This chapter insists on 
taking seriously the criticism that there has been a loss of ‘common sense’ in the application 
of the law due to the application of the HRA. It looks for the reasons behind these claims: is 
it a problem with the way the Convention’s rights are phrased? With the Strasbourg judges’ 
interpretation? With how the British government implements the ECHR?  Or something else 
altogether? 
                                                        
1 Speech University of Manchester, 2007. Cited in J Rozenberg, ‘£25,000 spent on human rights spin’ Daily 
Telegraph (London, 10 February 2007). 
2 This paper has benefitted from insightful comments from Dr David Rossati and from Frederick Cowell, the 
editor.  
3 L Gies, Mediating Human Rights (Taylor and Francis, 2014)18; Joint Committee on Human Rights, The Human 
Rights Act: the DCA and Home Office Reviews (2005-06, HL 278, HC 1716) 23-24.  
4 See D Mead, ‘“You Couldn’t Make It Up”: Some Narratives of the Media’s Coverage of Human Rights’, in The UK 
and European Human Rights: A Strained Relationship?, K S Ziegler, E Wicks, L Hodson (eds) (Hart, 2015) 453-472; 
A Wagner, ‘The monstering of human rights’, 19 September 2014, Talk to University of Liverpool Conference on 
Human Rights in the UK Media: Representation and Reality. 
<https://adam1cor.files.wordpress.com/2014/09/the-monstering-of-human-rights-adam-wagner-2014.pdf> 
accessed 25 September 16. 
5 Wagner (n 4). 
2 
 
Because journalists do not always need to express the reasons behind their arguments and 
can write in a polemic fashion, it is often difficult to assess what is really meant by the 
claimed loss of ‘common sense’. Fortunately, occasionally, they provide a selection of cases, 
such as when Jack Doyle of the Daily Mail chose 10 cases illustrating why the judges are ‘so 
wrong’ when they apply the ECHR.6 In the descriptions of the cases that are given, the 
problem is always to highlight something of the situation of the applicant which makes the 
outcomes absurd. In a nutshell, this is what the applicants stand for in these 10 cases: 
1) Hate preacher  
2) Sexual abuser 
3) Prisoners wanting to use methadone 
4) IRA terrorists  
5) Spy who was compensated for breach of free expression 
6) Murderer and career criminal  
7) Murderer  
8) Police chief who was doing unethical things who had her phone tapped 
9) The criminal not expelled for reasons of fear to his physical integrity if deported  
10)  Male to female transgender who could not get a pension as a female  
From the cases selected in that article, and in others7, two implicit dimensions of the ‘loss of 
common sense’ argument appear. The first common element for eight of these cases is that 
the beneficiary of the human rights law is somebody guilty of having committed serious 
criminal offenses such as murder, rape, sex offences, robbery etc., in other words a human 
rights abuser, or a ‘culprit’ claiming to be a victim.8 The assumption appears to be that 
human rights should be dependent on past behaviour. Under that view, unlinking rights 
from duties would thus be a ‘mockery’ of justice. The second common element is that each 
time the Strasbourg court finds a violation of the Convention in regard to the cases 
mentioned, critical newspapers and commentators dismiss it as being not serious enough in 
comparison to what the individual in question has done. Therefore human rights must deal 
with serious issues or otherwise fail into ‘madness’. Finally some cases are inspired from 
liberal values rejected by the press critical of the ECHR. 
These dimensions can be explained by the transformation of the common language of 
human rights into human rights law. The press and the human rights lawyers do not quite 
speak the same language when they address human rights questions. Both sides purport to 
discuss human rights issues as being tackled by courts but one does it from the perspective 
of the general public, the other from the legal one. This makes a crucial difference, in 
                                                        
6 James Slack ‘Europe's war on British justice: UK loses three out of four human rights cases, damning report 
reveals’, Daily Mail (London, 11 January 2012).  
7 See also the list provided in ‘Case by case: How Europe's human rights court has made a mockery of British 
justice’ Daily Mail (London, 10 February 2011). 
8 F Klug, ‘A Bill of Rights: do we need one or do we already have one?’ (2007) Public Law 701. 
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particular as human rights law is usually not presented as being much different from the 
media version.9  
When attacking the ECHR, the media make a series of assumptions, some express, some 
implied. Of those, many fail to match the premises on which the legal regime created by the 
HRA and the ECHR actually functions. It can appear that the criticisms made by the press 
against the court(s) are valid because they relate to a common view of what human rights 
should be and that human rights law only incidentally follows such a view. In many aspects 
they are actually far apart. Quite often the language used by the European Court of Human 
Rights is substantially different from the ‘common view’ expressed by the media (hereafter 
referred as the ‘common human rights language’).10 As human rights transformed into a 
legal language, it has been taken over by lawyers and legal institutions which alter both its 
form and substance.11 The legalisation of the human rights produce a modification of the 
content of the human rights away from a common sense of justice and at the same time give 
to expert judges powers which traditionally rested in domestic politics. Human rights law has 
moved from a shared will to use human rights as a way to fight potential totalitarian 
practices such as the atrocities committed during and in the wake of the Second World 
War 12  to a technical and managerial 13  legal language for which the fight against 
totalitarianism is no longer central.14The technical and managerial led transformations of 
human rights law explain four situations where the press may find nonsensical decisions.  
The first point is that the legal human rights language breaks the direct connection between 
the past behaviour of the applicant and their claim contrary to other branches of the law. 
For many critics of the ECHR, criminals should not have been found to be victims of human 
rights violations as they should primarily be seen as culprits. Unlike the structure and form 
of criminal law where third party like victims can participate in the procedure, human rights 
law has severed the link between the victim of a human rights abuse and the culprit. It only 
asks itself whether the government has unduly restricted the rights of the applicant. The 
second point is that the media often presumes that for a human rights question to be dealt 
by courts it should be sufficiently serious. This is a politically sensible argument which is 
shared by many member states and the Council of Europe itself. However, the seriousness 
of the issue is only one factor among others for deciding the admissibility and the substance 
                                                        
9 The Equality and Human Rights Commission for instance defines human rights in the following way on 
their website: ‘human rights are not just abstract concepts – they are defined and protected by law. In Britain 
our human rights are protected by the Human Rights Act 1998’. <www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/human-
rights/what-are-human-rights> accessed 26 September 2016. 
10 A Mooney ‘Human rights: Law, language and the bare human being’ 32(3) (2012) Language & Communication 
169. 
11 See S Meckled-García, B Çal (eds), The Legalization of Human Rights: Multidisciplinary Approaches, (Routledge, 
2006); N Kang-Riou ‘Confronting the legalization of human rights: a counterpoint’ in N Kang-Riou, J Milner, S 
Nayak (eds) Confronting the Human Rights Act: Contemporary Themes and Perspectives (Routledge, 2012) 9. 
12 See A W Brian Simpson, Human Rights and the End of Empire: Britain and the Genesis of the European 
Convention (OUP, 2001) Chapter 4. 
13 This is how Martti Koskenniemi describes this process of expert-rule: ‘the fate of the rule of law as power in 
international institutions is increasingly wielded by expert regimes and networks looking for ‘‘optimal’’ outcomes 
that tend to be situation-specific’. M Koskenniemi, ‘Human Rights Mainstreaming as a Strategy for Institutional 
Power’ (2010) 1(1) Humanity: An International Journal of Human Rights, Humanitarianism, and Development, 47. 
14 E Bates, The evolution of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2010). 
4 
 
of the claim under the ECHR. The third point is related to the second. Not only can a human 
rights court find a violation of human rights even when the restriction of the right can seem 
to be trivial, but they can also find some when a court is unsure if there has been a violation 
of a human right at all. Counter-intuitively, legally speaking a violation of the ECHR does not 
mean that an individual’s human rights have been breached. Finally, some cases which are 
as seen as ‘absurd’ arise from differing political values expressed in defining what human 
rights are. I conclude by mapping out some possibilities to bridge the gap between the two 
sets of discourses on human rights.   
1. Human rights law obfuscates the link between the past behaviour of an 
individual and their right to human rights  
The first ‘common sense’ statement, which has been widely put forward as an argument 
behind the UK Bill of rights, is that rights should be connected to the past behaviour of an 
individual making a rights claim. 15 Rights should not be disjointed from the responsibilities, 
doing anything else would go against common sense. In this area the conflict between 
human rights law and their opponents seem to be at their clearest. Most of the media pieces 
attacking the HRA and the ECHR base themselves on cases where criminals have been able 
to win cases for a breach of their human rights. This has been derided as making ‘a mockery 
of justice’16. Cases where convicted criminals are able to escape deportation on the basis 
that it would breach their right to private and family life are particularly targeted in this 
context.  
At first glance, the difference in perspective seems to be insurmountable. Newspapers 
opposed to the HRA clearly state that individuals who have committed serious crimes should 
not be able to claim that they have suffered a human rights violation because of what they 
did to their own victims. For Tony Parsons, in a 2014 Sun on Sunday column:  
‘The Human Rights Act is an affront to human decency. It contradicts everything the 
British believe about fairness and justice. It gives succour, comfort and aid to the 
perpetrators of evil and insults the good, the innocent and all the victims of crime. 
Foreigners who come to this country who murder, rob or rape should FORSAKE their 
right to a “family life” ’.17  
This is a denial that convicts still have human rights or at least is an argument that they only 
have a limited number of rights. At a cursory level, it is contrary to the nature of human 
rights law which asserts the unqualified and universal nature of human rights: all humans 
have rights regardless of their qualities.18 Of course upon closer examination, the operation 
of qualified rights contained in the ECHR, such as the right to private and family life, allows 
for restrictions. Human rights lawyers know very well that paragraph 2 of the right to private 
and family life, right to freedom of religion or the right to freedom of expression as set out in 
                                                        
15 See for a recent general discussion of the link between human rights and duties: S Parmentier, H 
Werdmölder, M Merrigan (eds) Between Rights and Responsibilities: A Fundamental Debate (Intersentia, 2016). 
16 Daily Mail (London, 3 October 2014). 
17 T Parsons, ‘Why the Human Rights Act is just so wrong’, The Sun on Sunday (London, 14 December 2014).  
18 Universal Declaration on Human Rights, Article 1. 
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ECHR, allow the government to restrict these rights if there is a legal basis, a legitimate aim 
and a necessity for such a restriction in a democratic society. Therefore a government can 
justify restrictions on the rights of a convict for public interest reasons, such as guaranteeing 
public safety. The evidence of the danger to the public is the past criminal behaviour. This is 
where a link between the rights and the responsibility of an individual appears, even though 
it is only an indirect and relative one. The British government has won many cases in 
Strasbourg or in front of British courts on such basis.19  
Critics of the media are quick to point out that cases where governments win and courts 
allow the deportation of criminals, or some other measure, are generally unreported by the 
media.20 Thus the reader of the press hostile to the HRA could be forgiven if they concurred 
with the statement regarding the operation of art 8 ECHR, that ‘[i]t doesn’t matter if you 
come to this country and rape, murder and steal’21. If this were true, it would go against the 
‘common sense’ approach to what immigration should be about. Most people would agree 
that a serious breach of criminal law is as bad a behaviour can get in a democratic society. In 
a world with borders, the immigration compact is based on the premise that upon an 
individual’s entry into the territory of another state they are required to respect its laws, 
especially its criminal legislation. It is therefore reasonable to refuse to let a person stay in a 
state if they have committed such a breach of the terms through which they were allowed 
to come in in the first instance. This is also what the European Court of Human Rights has 
consistently stated, noting that ‘the Convention does not guarantee the right of an alien to 
enter or to reside in a particular country and, in pursuance of their task of maintaining public 
order, Contracting States have the power to expel an alien convicted of criminal offences.’22 
In that same case, the Grand chamber of the Court has explicitly refused to assimilate long 
term migrants with nationals. It could thus seem that the critics have just failed to do their 
homework.  
The chasm comes from the way the Strasbourg Court has interpreted the operation of 
Article 8 in such circumstances. It balances the rights of the individual with the public 
interest by taking into account a series of factors, the severity of the offence committed 
being only one of them. The other elements are the length of applicant’s stay in the country 
from which they are to be expelled, the time since the offence was committed, the 
applicant’s conduct during that time and  the applicant's family situation and solidity of 
applicant’s social, cultural, and family ties with the host and destination countries23. 
Therefore the two sides being balanced are the crime on the one hand and the extent of the 
integration of the applicant on the other. The legal version no longer fits with the simpler 
test espoused by the media. 
In substance and in legal terms, what critics of the ECHR are pointing at is a divergent view 
on how the proportionality test should operate by insisting on the pre-eminence of the past 
                                                        
19 See for an analysis of the appeal against deportation decisions in the UK and in Strasbourg in 2011 and 2012: 
Klug ‘A Bill of Rights’ (n 8). 
20 Mead (n 4). 
21 ibid.  
22 Uner v Netherlands, ECHR 2006-XII, GC, para. 54.  
23 ibid. para. 57 and 58. 
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behaviour, as per the criminal law regime. The ECHR demands that restrictions of rights to 
be ‘necessary in a democratic society’. What that test entails is subject to interpretation. A 
plausible view could be that some crimes are so severe that in the case of foreign criminals 
they should always lead to an expulsion. This would be a legitimate restriction in legal terms 
and one which could not be so easily dismissed by human rights advocates. In fact such a 
reading is entirely possible under the Convention 24  making it arguable that the 
interpretation of the ECHR made by the Strasbourg court lacks common sense as it fails to 
integrate the operation of the ECHR within its wider societal context.25 Many believe that 
some crimes are in and of themselves sufficiently serious to allow for the balance to side 
with the protection of public order.  
The majority of the Strasbourg judges disagree. They have only recognised that crimes like 
rape or drug trafficking are generally a sufficient justification while at the same time 
allowing for exceptional individual circumstances to prevail over deportation. 26  The 
interpretation of the ECHR stems from a liberal perspective of law and justice. In particular it 
has rejected retributive justice to encompass a stronger view on restorative justice.27 When 
a convict claims a breach of right, the crime committed is assessed under its current impact 
not the past one towards the victims. Furthermore, as the case is based on a breach of 
human rights law, the convict is no longer seen in that perspective and the victim disappears 
from the procedure. What seems reasonable or common sense thus changes, as the liberal 
view insists on the importance of the individual character of the violation rather than on the 
general context. Thus it is structurally difficult for these two sets of views to be reconciled 
regarding the impact of the breach of past duties on the enjoyment of human rights.  
2. A breach of human rights law is not necessarily a serious human rights issue  
In the common discourse, when someone speaks of a human right violation it relates to 
something important, deeply affecting the individual concerned. This is how charities, NGOs 
dedicated to human rights such as Amnesty International or Human Rights Watch report 
human rights abuses taking place internationally. 28  This is also what human rights 
institutions focus upon when they circulate a press release, the media choosing to report on 
matters seen as being important by the public. Therefore if a finding of a human rights 
violation is publicised then it has to be deemed serious.29 This is one of the major criticisms 
of the HRA which can be seen in the cases cited as lacking ‘common sense’ and is 
summarised by Dominic Raab, a Tory MP and former solicitor as follows: 
                                                        
24 In a case where an individual was deported after convicted for drug trafficking, the Court stated that: ‘In view 
of the devastating effects of drugs on people’s lives, the Court understands why the authorities show great 
firmness with regard to those who actively contribute to the spread of this scourge’, Baghli v France, ECHR 1999-
VIII.  
25 For an academic view supporting this argument: see M Bossuyt, International Human Rights Protection: 
Balanced, Critical, Realistic (Intersentia, 2016). 
26 Beldjoudi v France (1992) Series A no 234-A. 
27 For a study on restorative justice see H V Miller (ed) Restorative Justice: From Theory to Practice (Emerald Pub, 
2008). 
28 On Amnesty International, see S Hopgood, Keepers of the Flame: Understanding Amnesty International (Cornell 
University Press, 2006). 
29  Of course different INGOs will see problems differently, see S Stroup, Borders among Activists: International 
NGOs in the United States, Britain, and France (Cornell University Press, 2012) Chapter 4.  
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‘The British tradition of liberty has been conflated as swathes of other comparatively 
minor grievances, claims and interests have been shoe-horned into the ever-elastic 
language of inalienable, unimpeachable and judicially enforceable rights. In place of our 
most basic – fundamental – freedoms, steadily eroded and undermined since 1997, we 
have witnessed the expansion of a range of novel, often trivial, rights.’30 
The finding of a breach of the ECHR does not mean that it necessarily constitutes an 
important case in relation to the applicant. The Court has always considered the severity of 
the breach for the applicant as only one element to be taken into account in order to decide 
the admissibility of the application. Prior to Protocol 14, the only test applicable in that 
respect was that an application should not be ‘manifestly ill-founded’.31 This covers many 
components including the lack of importance of the restriction of the right complained of.32 
This has not prevented the Court from finding violations of the Convention where at first 
sight the behaviour of the state does not seem to have been wrong. Technically it is 
sufficient for the court to find an illegal restriction of the right. Often the operation of the 
law fails to distinguish between serious breach of a provision and a minor breach.  
A case usually cited by the British press in this context is Mc Cann and others v UK.33  The 
case concerned IRA members in Gibraltar who were killed by the Special Air Service who 
genuinely thought they were in a middle of a car bombing attack, whereas they were only 
conducting the preparations for future bombing. The Court did not refute that the killing 
was absolutely necessary to prevent a crime and therefore was compatible with Article 2 of 
the ECHR, the right to life. Still it found a breach of Article 2 because of the behaviour of the 
government in the circumstances leading to the attempted arrest. In particular, they pointed 
towards the decision not to try to arrest the IRA members when they landed at the airport in 
Gibraltar where it would have been less risky. The tabloid press later claimed that the case 
“outraged the public”.34  
The Daily Mail was also dismayed35 by the decision in Blackstock v the UK36. The Strasbourg 
Court found a breach of the right to liberty guaranteed by Article 5 of the ECHR because 
there was no review of an individual’s continued detention after the minimum tariff of 
imprisonment had expired. Failure to conduct such a review, the Court held, constituted a 
breach of Article 5, even if there was no evidence that an earlier review would have led to 
an earlier release. 
In both cases, the press did not seem to see a restriction of the right which would warrant 
the finding of a breach. Interestingly this criticism has borne fruit within the system itself 
                                                        
30 D Raab, The Assault on Liberty: what went wrong with rights (Fourth Estate, 2009) xviii. 
31 L Zwaak, ‘The procedure before the European Court of Human Rights’, in P Van Dijk et al (eds) Theory and 
Practice of the ECHR (Intersentia, 4th edn, 2006) 198-199. 
32 A Buyse, ‘Significantly Insignificant? The Life in the Margins of the Admissibility Criterion in Article 35(3)(b)’, in 
Y Haeck, B McGonigle Leyh, C Burbano Herrera (eds) The Realisation of Human Rights: When Theory Meets 
Practice (Intersentia, 2014) 107. 
33 (1995) Series A no 234. This case is listed among the 10 cases cited (n 6). 
34 Daily Mail ‘Case by case’ (n 7). 
35 Slack (n 6). 
36 App. no 9152/00 (ECtHR, 21 June 2005). 
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through the introduction of the de minimis criterion of admissibility with Protocol 14, which 
allows the Court to dismiss a case if ‘the applicant has not suffered a significant 
disadvantage’ (Article 35 para. 3(b)).37 Still, even in these circumstances the Court is not 
bound to dismiss a case if it believes that it is demanded for the ‘respect for human rights’38. 
It can thus continue to examine cases that the press would find unreasonable to consider in 
human rights terms. For instance the Court has agreed to deal with a case even though the 
original dispute concerned 17 euros, because it was important for the national courts to 
know the correct interpretation of the ECHR.39 No doubt that if it had concerned the UK, it 
would have been rejected by the press as nonsensical.   
3. A breach of human rights law is not necessarily of breach of human rights  
The media tend to conflate violations of human rights law with violations of human rights. 
However, lawyers know that the transformation of anything external to law into law, such as 
human rights, necessarily result in structural changes regarding the meaning and application 
of the imported concept.40 This is also true regarding the application of the ECHR. Two cases 
vilified in the press illustrate this problem well: Averill and Hirst. 41 
In Averill v UK42, the UK was found in breach of the right to a fair trial (Article 6 ECHR) 
because the applicant did not have access to a lawyer during the first 24 hours of his 
interrogation, contrary to an (extensive) interpretation of the Convention affirmed by the 
Court43. However, he stayed silent during the whole time. He was then found guilty of 
murder. It is doubtful that the failure to follow procedural rules had a negative impact on 
the applicant in that case, even if the trial judge did make an inference from his silence in 
the first 24 hours.44 As he stayed silent even after being represented, it is very unlikely that 
even if he had been assisted earlier by a lawyer that the outcome would have changed. The 
fact that he was not awarded any pecuniary damages by the Court is significant as it points 
towards Strasbourg judges believing that the applicant did not suffer any adverse impact. Of 
course, what the Strasbourg Court is after in such cases, is to make sure that the procedural 
guarantees are in place regardless of the circumstances so they can benefit society at large. 
This is an example of an individual case being used more as a tool to ensure general 
compliance from the defending state rather than to provide individuals reparations for 
individual breaches of their human rights. From a ‘common sense’ view it can seem wrong 
to find a breach of human rights in the person of Mr Averill; from the perspective of the 
Court, it was necessary as the procedural guarantee that the right to a lawyer must be in 
place in all circumstances of the case to uphold the rule of law.45  
                                                        
37 Buyse (n 32). 
38 Article 35(2) ECHR. 
39 Nicoleta Gheorghe v Romania App no 23470/05 (ECtHR, 3 April 2012). 
40 For a general sociological account, see N Luhmann, Law as a social system (tr K A Ziegert, OUP, 2004) esp. 
chapter 2. 
41 Both cases are listed in the 10 cases mentioned above (n 5). 
42 ECHR 2000-II 212. 
43 Murray (John) v UK, ECHR 1996-I. 
44 Averill v UK, para 48. 
45 Explanation provided about the rule in Salduz v Turkey App no 36391/02 (ECtHR, 20 November 2008) para 55. 
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One case which has generated strong opposition, not only from the press46, but also from 
both the Conservative and Labour parties is Hirst47. The finding of a violation rested on the 
existence of an absolute ban for all prisoners to vote regardless of their personal 
circumstances. The Strasbourg court recognised the compatibility with the Convention of 
legislations enforcing a ban on prisoners’ voting for certain categories of prisoner. Mr Hirst 
would have clearly fallen within such categories, as he had been convicted to a life sentence 
for murder. Removing his individual right to vote would have been completely acceptable 
under the ECHR, as confirmed later by the Court in another case.48 Therefore, Mr Hirst had 
not been subject to a violation of his human right to vote in the substantive sense. In that 
case the Court targeted a general issue in the UK, both the lack of specific parliamentary 
discussion of the prohibition to vote for all detainees and its absolute character regardless of 
the individual circumstances. Again here, from a ‘common sense’ perspective, it could seem 
absurd to find a breach of Mr Hirst’s right to vote, as even if legislation had been passed to 
allow for some prisoners to vote, it would never have included individuals sentenced for 
long term sentences.49  
There are many caveats to be added to the statement that a violation of a human rights 
treaty was found by an international human rights court. It may sound substantively similar 
to stating that there was a finding of a breach of a universally accepted human rights but it is 
rather different. Some reasons are quite simple and linked to the development of a highly 
specialised and technical language. The European Court of Human Rights is tasked with the 
interpretation of the Convention and not the interpretation of human rights in a more 
general or wider sense. The Court is bound by the vocabulary used in the text of the 
Convention and more importantly it tends to follow its own case-law.50 Regarding the 
former, the court has been quite happy to ignore or rewrite some of parts of it using 
interpretative tools.51 So the latter is more decisive. As a consequence a finding of a 
violation by the Court is relative and specific to the ECHR itself it is not necessarily a 
statement that a universally accepted human rights norm has been breached. This is the 
case the breach of Article 3 Protocol 1 in Hirst which can only be understood in the context 
of the development of the case law, not only of that provision, but also more generally in 
the Convention. For instance, the Court has developed the procedural dimension of the 
Convention rights by insisting that the restrictions placed on rights are discussed and 
justified by parliaments or domestic judges.52 
                                                        
46 T Shipman, ‘6,000 Perverts and Thugs to Get the Vote: Tory Rebels’ Fury at Plans to Let Inmates Cast a Ballot’ 
Daily Mail (London, 6 January 2011). 
47 Hirst v UK, ECHR 2005-IX, GC. 
48 Scoppola (No. 3) v Italy, app no 126/05, GC (ECtHR, 22 May 2012). 
49 The bill made in order to comply with Hirst at best offered the vote for prisoners with less than a 4 years 
sentence. See Draft Voting Eligibility (Prisoners) Bill 2012 Cm 8499. 
50 See A Mowbray, ‘An Examination of the European Court of Human Rights’ Approach to Overruling its Previous 
Case Law’ (2009) 9(2) Human Rights Law Review 179-201. 
51 G Letsas, A Theory of Interpretation of the European Convention on Human Rights (OUP, 2007); A Mowbray, 
‘The Creativity of the European Court of Human Rights’ (2005) 5 Human Rights Law Review 5. 
52 E Brems, ‘Procedural protection: an examination of procedural safeguards read into substantive Convention 
rights’ in E Brems, G Janneke (eds) Shaping Rights in the ECHR (Cambridge University Press, 2014) 156.  
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Secondly, the Court has several objectives when making an interpretation of ECHR. They are 
broadly defined within the preamble of the ECHR: rule of law, democracy and human rights. 
The protection of human rights is only one of the elements to be taken into account by the 
Court. It believes that human rights are truly protected only in a society which respects the 
rule of law and democracy.53 The aim of the ECHR as interpreted by the Court is not only 
about the protection of the individual rights of the applicant but more generally to ensure 
the protection of human rights within the state party to the Convention. In Hirst, the Court 
asserted that a fundamental aspect of democracy had not been respected as the link 
between the loss of the right and the individual had not been explained by the UK 
Parliament. Regarding the rule of law, one key dimension of the ECHR is the development of 
procedural obligations. There the Court is targeting the operation of the state as a whole, 
rather than looking at any individual situation. Any refusal of the application of the law, even 
if benign in a particular case, is wrong when the wider situation is taken into account. The 
state should always abide by accepted rules, including the ones stemming from an 
evolutionary interpretation of the ECHR, which was the issue in Averill.  
The development of the interpretation of the ECHR in both its rule of law dimension and its 
procedural components ineluctably lead towards a wider disconnect with the common 
sense understanding of what human right violations are. In these two examples, the extent 
of the infringement of the rights is not the basis of the breach of the Convention. In Averill 
and Hirst, the breach comes first from a deviation from the constructed obligations of the 
state towards all, regardless of the individual situation. This is contrary to the perspective on 
the cases taken by the media and politicians who discuss the limitation of the rights in 
relation to the behaviour of the state complained of. In that respect, the Court’s decisions 
can seem as lacking common sense as even though they are fully aligned with the objectives 
it has set itself, their decisions appear to be going beyond the individual situations brought 
to their attention. The Court through its case law has thoroughly extended the range of the 
rights protected far from the ‘bare’ human rights of the individual whereas part of the media 
have stayed with this original vision. 54 
4. A finding of a breach of human rights law can be politically influenced  
Several cases have been selected by the Daily Mail55 as bad examples because the 
Strasbourg court judgments reflected a (liberal) view of society seemingly at odds with the 
(conservative) values of the newspaper. Two cases illustrate this: Tyrer, a case a corporal 
punishment and B and L a case relating to the right to marriage.   
In Tyrer v UK56, the UK was found in breach of Article 3 of the ECHR as corporal punishment 
was inflicted to a child in a school on the Isle of Man. This judgment was criticised for 
undermining Britain’s ‘reasonable chastisement’ law which allowed parents to smack their 
children, but has also led to limits on corporal punishment by parents.57 Even though the 
                                                        
53 See for instance, Malone v UK (1984) Series A no 82, para 79. 
54 Mooney (n 9). 
55 Daily Mail ‘Case by case’ (n 6).  
56 (1982) 4 EHRR 232. 
57 ibid.  
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international legislative trend points towards a limitation of physical punishment58 this is still 
resisted by part of the population, by Tory politicians but also Labour.59 Critics of the 
judgment warned that a ‘nanny state’ was being developed from Strasbourg.60  This 
generated a divide between what seemed to be reasonable in the UK and among the 
Strasbourg judges. 
In B and L v UK61 the Court found a breach of Article 12, the right to marriage, because of the 
prohibition of marriage in UK law between a father-in-law and daughter-in-law. The Daily 
Mail argued against this claiming that ‘[c]enturies-old rules banning marriage between 
children and their parents-in-law were swept aside… [T]he ban had been cemented in law 
for more than 400 years in the Book of Common Prayer’.62 This was presented as a case of 
traditional values being challenged by the Court, even though the Labour government of the 
time had been looking at changing the law. In both cases, the disagreement as to what 
counts as common sense is imbued with values. Liberals approve whilst conservatives 
oppose, both sides believing they represent what common sense should be. This division is 
traditionally at the centre of the political divide between left and right across Europe. What 
this highlights is not so much an issue of common sense but of politics and relates to what 
many lawyers have noted concerning the political dimension of decisions taken by the 
Court.63  
Even within the discourse of human rights law, there are various politics at play in terms of 
interpretation and application what that law should mean. There is no accepted single view 
within the human rights law community of what is the correct interpretation of human 
rights law in many situations. One needs to look no further than at the dissenting opinions of 
Strasbourg judges to see that even they can be divided.64 There are also oppositions to the 
European view of human rights stemming from the national legal profession.65 The discourse 
of human rights law tends to present itself as technical, an application of what is the correct 
application of the rules for the situation in question. This is only partly true. Judgments are 
also the result of the application of political preferences by judges. By political, what is 
meant is that the courts decisions are taken through a mechanism very similar than the one 
taken by politicians when a proportionality test is conducted. The outcome of such a test 
depends on personal views as to what the good life is, of how society should function.66 This 
                                                        
58 See P R Ghandhi and J A James ‘Parental rights to reasonable chastisement and the European court of human 
rights’ (1999) 3(3) The International Journal of Human Rights 97. 
59 ibid. 98. 
60 C M Lyon ‘Spare the Rod - care for the child: A consideration of proposed changes to the Law on reasonable 
chastisement of children in the different jurisdictions of the UK’ (2001) 7(3) Child Care in Practice 193. 
61 (2006) 42 EHRR 195. 
62 Daily Mail ‘Case by case’ (n 6). 
63 G Beck, ‘Human rights adjudication under the ECHR between value pluralism and essential contestability’ 
(2008) European Human Rights Law Review, 214-244; N Valticos, ‘Interprétation juridique et idéologies in 
Protection des droits de l'homme : la perspective européenne’, in P Mahoney et al (eds) Mélanges à la mémoire 
de Rolv Ryssdal (Carl Heymanns Verlag, 2000) 1471-1482. 
64 R CA White, I Boussiakou ‘Separate opinions in the European court of human rights’ (2009) Human Rights Law 
Review 37-60. 
65 See for instance, A L Kjær, L Palsbro ‘National identity and law in the context of European integration: the case 
of Denmark’ (2008) 19 (5) Discourse and Society 599–627. 
66 D Kennedy, A Critique of Adjudication (Fin de Siècle) (Harvard University Press, 1997) 58. 
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process is bound to lead to differences as to what is the common sense answer to a 
particular question. Generally speaking in a democracy, it is elected MPs who are tasked 
with solving diverging views on how to achieve a good society. According to the media 
hostile to the ECHR, the ones to make this kind of judgements should be British67. This 
disagreement is then more about who decides what common sense is than how it is 
decided.68 
Conclusion: limiting the expert rule   
This chapter has looked at some of the structural reasons why the legal discourse of the 
European Court of Human Rights often moves away from a common sense understanding as 
to what human rights violations are. Media hostile to the ECHR are quick to point out 
apparently absurd decisions which insufficiently take into account the overall context of the 
case or fail to provide convincing reasons as to why there was a breach of human rights. The 
language of human rights law has transformed the finding of a violation of the ECHR in an 
exercise which is quite different from the one tabloids conduct, which tend to rest on a 
minimalist version of human rights. Of course, there are many biases within the media as 
well. They are for instance much more prompt to recognise human rights violations abroad 
than those in the UK69, or need to feel a sufficient emotional proximity to the victim to side 
with them. But that does not explain away the gap in perception between the two. The 
differences between the premises behind the operation of the human rights test under the 
‘common sense’ or by lawyers are so important that it is unavoidable that the role of the 
Strasbourg led interpretation of the ECHR in the UK constitution continues to be challenged.  
Nevertheless there are ways to close the gap between the two perspectives without needing 
to leave the ECHR. This can be done by both member states and Strasbourg. On the states 
side, they need to claim their full role in the operation of the ECHR by developing their 
domestic interpretations of rights within the language of the Convention. As it was discussed 
in part 1, decisions dealing with the potential breach of art 8 protecting the right to private 
and family life are mainly about setting the boundary for the application of a proportionality 
test. With the Immigration Act 201470, the UK government has understood that well, 
providing domestic judges with clear guidance as to how the test should operate. This is one 
avenue for states to use at the maximum the margin of appreciation granted by the 
European Court of Human Rights to balance the interests of different parties.71 This could 
limit the creation of judge policy making in domestically sensitive areas.72 
                                                        
67 Of course some of the decisions attacked have been made by British judges without following direct guidelines 
from Strasbourg. But the argument still stands. 
68 Koskenniemi (n 13). 
69 L Gies, Mediating Human Rights (Taylor and Francis, 2014).  
70 Immigration Act 2014, s 19.  
71 D Spielman ‘Allowing the Right Margin. The European Court of Human Rights and the National Margin of 
Appreciation Doctrine: Waiver or Subsidiarity of European Review?’ (2012) Cambridge Yearbook of European 
Legal Studies 381. 
72 This idea of a wider margin has been actively pursued by the British government at the time of the Presidency 
of the Council of Europe in 2012. See High Level Conference on the Future of the European Court of Human 
Rights, Brighton Declaration, 20 April 2012. 
<www.echr.coe.int/Documents/2012_Brighton_FinalDeclaration_ENG.pdf > accessed 26 September 2016. 
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Another way to bridge the gap is for the Strasbourg Court to be more careful when selecting 
the cases they use to evolve case-law. It would have been easy for the Court to dismiss the 
application made by Mr Hirst as manifestly ill-founded, leaving only applicants who have 
been detained for short period of times as the battle ground for discussing the right to vote 
of prisoners. The Court should be more politically savvy; it should know that the 
implementation and respect of its decisions is not something that can be taken for granted. 
It should be better at taking a pragmatic view of how legitimacy impacts its efficacy in 
particular in a time where many states have continuously failed to implement decisions.73 
Finally the Court also needs to define the limits of its judicial creativity, if it wants to 
continue to keep its role as the provider of a concrete level of human rights protection in 
Europe and continue to expand without endangering the system itself.74 The debate which 
arose between the Sir Gerald Fitzmaurice and the other judges of the European Court of 
Human rights in the 1970s about the interpretative role of the Court has not been 
definitively settled.75 What was acceptable in the 1980s or 1990s, an era of further European 
integration and of the intellectual supremacy of the liberal model (at least in the West), 
seems to have changed in the new millennium. The June 2016 UK vote to leave the EU is a 
clear example of a growing popular rejection of the liberal discourse of European integration 
through legal institutions. Because of the issues highlighted here, and the more general 
problems with the human rights discourse76, the debate about what human rights are much 
wider than the legal realm, it must go beyond lawyers. At the same time one must deal with 
the tension of limiting the potential excesses of expert rule whilst continuing to allow for an 
external control on national governments behaviours restricting human rights.  
                                                        
73 Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe, Committee on Legal Affairs and Human Rights, 
Implementation of judgments of the European Court of Human Rights, Report Doc. 13864, 09 September 2015. 
74 One example of scholarship geared towards setting boundaries, even though vague ones: B Hale, ‘Common 
law and Convention law: the limits to interpretation’ (2011) European Human Rights Law Review 234. 
75 See Bates (n 14) 319. 
76 M Koskenniemi ‘The Effect of Rights on Political Culture’, in P Alston (ed) The European Union and Human 
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